INTRODUCTION
Maritime piracy is an ancient problem that harms, either directly or indirectly, many states and non-state actors alike.
1 There has been a geographical shift in the places where acts of modern piracy 2 take place. Whereas previously the waters off the coast of Somalia were considered to be the "hot spot", at present pirate attacks most often occur in Southeast Asia (mainly around Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia), the Gulf of Guinea (e.g. Nigeria), and the Indian subcontinent.
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The legal framework addressing piracy on the high seas and in the exclusive economic zone 4 is provided by articles 100-107 and 110(1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 5 (LOSC). These provisions reflect customary international law. Article 100 LOSC obliges states to cooperate in repressing piracy. There are various ways in which states comply with this obligation in practice: by deploying navy vessels to patrol certain risk areas, or (regionally) through counter piracy operations such as "Atalanta" 6 (European Union) and "Ocean Shield" 7 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) off the coast of Somalia, or through Several differences arise between the phenomenon of PCASP in the piracy context at sea, and the classic situation where a PSC operates on land (either in an armed conflict setting or not).
More actors (both states and non-state actors), nationalities and jurisdictions are involved when private security personnel operates on the high seas. 13 States that are involved include the flag state; coastal state(s); state(s) of nationality of the individual employees; and the state under whose laws the company employing PCASP operates. Non-state actors include PCASP; the company employing PCASP; the ship-owner; and the master of the vessel. All of these actors have relevant rights and obligations. Matters are often complicated due to the possibility of overlapping jurisdictions for the prescription and/or the enforcement of rules (e.g. if a merchant vessel enters the territorial sea of a coastal state). Another particularity with regard to PCASP operating on vessels at sea, concerns the role of the master of the vessel (who is in charge of the safety of the vessel and the safety of life at sea), and his relationship to PCASP. In contrast to the situation of having a vessel protection detachment (VPD) on board, a master could be held responsible under domestic criminal and civil law for the use of force by PCASP (although neither having control over PCASP, nor being trained for this task), or for having firearms on board in case a state does not allow this. 14 The factual scenarios, applicable laws and the resulting accountability issue that arise from operating on the high seas may also differ from those on land.
International law seeking to regulate the certification, deployment, use of force, accountability, and oversight of PCASP on vessels (and companies that employ them) is currently either nonexistent, or at best, in the process of being developed. Therefore, it can be said that international law is inadequately developed and tailored to deal with the issue at hand.
Accountability issues that have arisen over the conduct of PCASP operating at sea have received little attention in literature, nor are they addressed in any international regulatory framework, possibly leading to the conclusion that the international law applicable in this respect is flawed. Notwithstanding this, some soft law regulations, voluntary principles, and codes of conduct for the umbrella category of private security service providers do exist.
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However, since these are not legally binding they "cannot be considered as complete solutions 13 The terminology is also different ("host state", "contracting state", "home state") are all terms that are not part of the vocabulary used in the law of the sea context. In the next section, problems arising from the use of PCASP in the maritime context will be discussed. After that, the concept of shared accountability will be briefly dealt with. Central to the subsections that follow are the rights and obligations of flag states, under both international human rights law and the law of the sea. The possibility of (flag) state responsibility, and the practice of the Netherlands as a case study will subsequently be discussed. The chapter will end with some concluding remarks on whether international law is flawed in this context.
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE USE OF PCASP AT SEA
In terms of numbers, according to Spearin, there are "several hundred PMSC personnel at sea in the Gulf of Aden or beyond at any given moment". 25 In the Indian Ocean there are reportedly over 140 companies providing armed protection to vessels, employing a minimum of 2,700 armed guards. 26 The following quote strikingly illustrates the problem:
Fear of pirate attacks is creating more violent and chaotic seas, where some overzealous or untrained guards are shooting indiscriminately, killing pirates and sometimes innocent fishermen before verifying the threat, according to more than two dozen interviews with lawyers, ship owner groups, insurance underwriters and maritime security companies.
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The use of PCASP is not considered to be unlawful under international law, per se. 28 The concept of "shared responsibility", as developed by Nollkaemper and Jacobs, refers to a situation in which multiple actors (which can be a combination of states, international organizations, and/or non-state actors, such as individuals and multinational corporations) are responsible ex post facto under international law for a contribution (either act or omission) to a particular harmful outcome. 41 The term "shared accountability" is used for situations where "a multiplicity of actors is held to account for conduct in contravention of international norms, but 46 In order for shared responsibility to be assumed, flag states must be bound by obligations, which will be dealt with in the next section.
OBLIGATIONS OF FLAG STATES

Obligations under the law of the sea
In general, a flag state has the same obligations as any other state. However, the LOSC regime places specific obligations on this special category of states, which can be seen as dutyfocused. According to article 91(1) of the LOSC, each state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly.
There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. Article 92(1) provides that a ship "shall sail under the flag of one State only and (…) shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas". The exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state on the high seas includes prescriptive, enforcement and adjudicatory jurisdiction. 47 A consequence that flows from this right is that a flag state is under an obligation to enact legislation, and enforce its laws.
In principle, the flag state can extend its jurisdiction to the vessels flying its flag, and to the individuals on board. According to international law, vessels are usually not considered to be part of the territory of a flag state. However, vessels are often equated with territory, and states can provide in their domestic law for their vessels to be part of the state's territory. 48 Article 94 of the LOSC specifies the obligations of flag states in a non-exhaustive list. Article 94(1) provides that every flag state "shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag". In the remainder of this article, duties are included to take the necessary measures to ensure that ships flying its flag are safe; to maintain a shipping register; to ensure that the crew is properly qualified; and to hold an inquiry "into every maritime casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals of another State or serious damage to ships". 49 For example, Dutch domestic law covers the flag state principle in Article 3 of the Criminal Code, giving the Netherlands criminal jurisdiction over an offense that has been committed by a foreign national or a Dutch national outside its land territory, on board a ship that is registered in the Netherlands.
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Flag states have a further obligation to make sure that their vessels are not being used for criminal activities. The exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state on the high seas (article 92(1) LOSC) comes with the corresponding primary obligation to maintain security and safety at sea, to "safeguard a minimum ordre public in the oceans". 51 Aside from the obligations arising out of article 94(1) LOSC, this also means that a flag state is under a due diligence obligation to monitor that its vessels are not used to harm other actors using the seas. Under the ICCPR, a state "needs to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant", without distinction concerning nationality. 59 This is generally considered to impose a positive obligation on a state to ensure that ICCPR rights are protected, without distinction to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. 60 A flag state has de jure and de facto jurisdiction and control over victims (and perpetrators) that are on board its vessel, which is often equated with a flag states' territory and is regarded as an extension of its (land) territory. Although a ship is neither 'floating territory', nor is it part of the territory of a state, a flag state has jurisdiction as if its vessel is its territory. A flag state grants its vessels its nationality (article 91 LOSC) which consequently brings with it the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and control over its vessels for states to investigate, as they "must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention". 63 A breach of the procedural obligation entails a breach of the substantive obligation.
Human rights obligations
In view of this, it can be concluded that flag states have an obligation under international human rights law to adequately respond to an incident involving alleged human rights abuses by PCASP. Flag states are required to have their domestic authorities conduct a prompt, comprehensive, effective and impartial investigation into violations that allegedly occurred, involving the (disproportionate) use of (lethal) force of PCASP against suspected pirates at sea.
Whenever a violation has taken place, the perpetrators must be held to account. However, in practice some difficulties might arise as a consequence of the transnational nature of PCASP operating at sea.
(Flag) state responsibility
The above considerations raise the following questions: can a flag state incur responsibility when an individual is injured or killed, as a result of ARSIWA is also unlikely since the flag state did not instruct, nor exercised control over the conduct of an individual PCASP employee.
Elaborating on the concept of due diligence, the Seabed Dispute Chamber of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea found in its 2011 advisory opinion that due diligence is considered to be "an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result". 65 The Chamber also held that "[t]he standard of due diligence has to be more severe for the riskier activities." 66 Applying this reasoning to PCASP, which are armed private persons on the high seas that carry out a hazardous activity, it can be argued that the standard of due diligence needs to be set high. However, control of a state over acts of private individuals within its jurisdiction, and the ability to properly enforce its laws, is more limited when it comes to acts that occur on the high seas, particularly given its vast area.
A state's capacity to de facto control the conduct of private actors may depend on the maritime zone involved and the resources of a flag state, but in any case differs from what can be expected from a state on land territory. This is important for determining the level of due diligence that can be required from flag states in relation to PCASP. A flag state can hardly be expected to patrol the high seas in order to physically monitor all vessels flying its flag in search of human rights violations. Therefore, the issue is not so much responsibility arising from a failure to prevent abuses by PCASP ex ante, 67 but rather more importantly, the responsibility for failing to adequately investigate when harm occurred ex post facto.
Because it is currently not required to report incidents involving human rights violations on the high seas, the scale of the problem involving PCASP is difficult to estimate. The requirement to report (e.g. by the master) possible abuses is arguably part of the due diligence obligations of a flag state. 68 Given that incidents of human rights abuses at sea are harder to detect than on land, one can assume that more incidents have happened without ever being noticed. By combining a flag state's obligations under the law of the sea and human rights law, the In addition, the (procedural) obligation to investigate incidents may give rise to international responsibility for a flag state if it did not launch an investigation although it was required to do so.
THE PRACTICE OF A FLAG STATE -THE NETHERLANDS AS A CASE STUDY
The Netherlands has a long maritime history. It has a strong shipping industry and has been a seafaring nation for more than five centuries. Assuming that PCASP will be allowed under Dutch law in the near future, 77 how should the Netherlands deal with human rights abuses by PCASP on board its vessels? Presumably, the state will act in a similar manner as if it would involve someone who is part of a VPD that is allegedly involved in human rights abuses of an individual. 78 Currently, any use of force by a VPD is "reported in the form of an 'After Action Review' to the Royal Netherlands
Marechaussee" (the "police" for Dutch armed forces), which will then be forwarded with recommendations to the Public Prosecutor. 79 In the case of PCASP, which are private persons, in contrast to VPD which are organs of the state, the Netherlands should nevertheless enact legislation on how to deal with reported incidents (this presupposes compliance with the obligation to report incidents) in order to abide by its obligations under international law. The
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Currently, there is a lack of effective and binding regulation of the use of force, and specific shortcomings in addressing human rights abuses on the high seas by PCASP exist. This leads to the conclusion that international law is flawed in this respect, in that it does not specifically regulate this actor operating at sea. On a positive note, some efforts are being made to develop legally binding instruments to regulate the certification, deployment, use of force, accountability, and oversight of PCASP, which admittedly is a phenomenon of a more recent origin. It is strange that rules on certification, regulation of the use of force of PCASP, and monitoring are lacking, since almost all other tasks and issues that might arise on board a vessel have been addressed at the international level.
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While in principle there is nothing wrong with outsourcing security at sea, there is a risk that flag states do nothing in response to, or even turn a blind eye to, human rights violations that may take place as a consequence. Such outsourcing does not absolve flag states from their obligations under international law regarding PCASP, to whom they have de facto delegated the task of providing security. Whenever a flag state allows PCASP on board its vessels, it should make use of its exclusive prescriptive, enforcement and adjudicatory jurisdiction on the high seas regarding PCASP activities. Arguably, the combination of obligations arising under the law of the sea and human rights law leads to the conclusion that when a flag state has not enacted legislation to regulate their activities, it is by default responsible for failing to exercise the required measure of due diligence in instances where human rights violations were committed by PCASP. In addition, the obligation to investigate incidents may give rise to international responsibility for a flag state when it has failed to launch an investigation.
Prior to the enactment of binding and specific rules, or perhaps until a system of shared responsibility including all contributing actors (besides flag states these actors might also comprise other states and non-state actors, as mentioned in the introduction) is established, the current accountability gap may be temporarily filled by re-emphasizing the role and obligations of flag states, which might lead to state responsibility. The question remains, however, what the forum would be where international responsibility of a flag state might be established. For example, will Somalia in the future bring a case against a flag state for failing to prevent Somali citizens (whether pirates or fishermen) from being killed? Will a claim be brought by an individual against a flag state under an international or regional human rights mechanism, or 80 Thanks to Peter van der Kruit for pointing this out.
will state responsibility of a flag state be established before a domestic court? It remains to be seen what will happen in the future, but since international law has proven to be adaptive to new challenges, there is hope that the current situation will be effectively dealt with.
